Filsafat kecerdasan buatan

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Filsafat kecerdasan buatan berupaya menjawab pertanyaan seperti:[1]

  • Dapatkah mesin bertindak secara cerdas? Dapatkah mesin menyelesaikan semua masalah yang akan diselesaikan seseorang dengan cara berpikir?
  • Apakah mesin memiliki budi dan kesadaran seperti manusia? Dapatkan mereka merasakan?
  • Apakah kecerdasan manusia dan mesin itu sama? Apakah otak manusia pada dasarnya merupakan sebuah komputer?

Tiga pertanyaan tersebut melambangkan ketertarikan peneliti, filsuf, dan ilmuwan kognitif kecerdasan buatan. Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut bergantung pada bagaimana seseorang mendefinisikan "kecerdasan" atau "kesadaran" dan "mesin" mana yang sedang diperbincangkan.

Dalil-dalil penting dalam kecerdasan buatan adalah:

Catatan kaki[sunting | sunting sumber]

  1. ^ Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, hlm. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.
  2. ^ This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing Test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, hlm. 6–9, Crevier 1993, hlm. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 2–3 and 948
  3. ^ McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, hlm. 28
  4. ^ Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 18
  5. ^ This version is from (Searle 1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, hlm. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, hlm. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by (Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."
  6. ^ Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

Referensi[sunting | sunting sumber]